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I. 
 Our ontological common sense conception of entities (i.e. adults’ metaphysical 
conceptual scheme [AMCS]) is mainly about complete concrete entities (objects), say 
tables, buildings, trees and so forth (vid.: Strawson (1959); Part. I, sec.: 3.). Depending 
on the activity adults perform they can conceive parts as complete concrete entities, e.g. 
hitting a ball with a broom’s handle. From this conception the relevant kind of entities 
with which we (adults) establish and design interactions and predictions to move us in 
the world is the kind of concrete entities known by us as agents –i.e. the kind of entities 
which we effectively could touch, manipulate, reconstruct, and such objects that we 
could avoid etc. Shadows and holes seem to remain outside the domain of this kind and 
then the relevant kind to establish and design interactions and predictions by adults not 
includes these non-concrete entities. This conclusion needs to be clarified. 
 
II. 
Many studies have shown that cognitive development of the relevant body of capacities 
that gives rise to our AMCS depends on tracking and counting parts, holes and 
shadows. These studies have shown that infants start to track holes and shadows after 
they can individuate objects from spatiotemporal information (cf.: Spelke (1993); P.: 
451- 458.), then, we could infer that the core aspect of objects in early interaction 
framework loses his central place since non-objects become to play certain roles in the 
following developmental stages.  
We have evidence to claim that the domain of entities tracked by 3-years-olds not only 
includes objects but also includes non-object entities (cf.: Giralt & Bloom (2000)). We 
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need to specify the place of these roles to establish interactions with external events in 
adult’s life trough developmental stages: the role of tracking parts, non-object entities 
and objects individuated from spatiotemporal and featural information. This analysis 
will allow us to specify how special non-objects and objects are to strengthen a human 
adaptive ontological pretheoretical conception.  
We are tempted to accept that the final status of our cognitive metaphysical framework 
is to provide human beings with necessary capacities to interact with external events in 
favour of their purposes. In this sense, non-objects could work as pointer entities, slave 
of and derivative from objects (vid.: Casati & Varzi (1994)) to establish and design 
interactions with external events (vid.: image). This hypothesis will be briefly explored 
here.  
 
 
Some scientists (cf.: Burke (1952), Spelke et. al. (1995), Pylyshyn (2001) and Scholl 
(2001)) have shown that spatiotemporal information –indexed by, e.g., continuity in 
movable objects trough displays- has the central role to individuate concrete complete 
entities. The question concerning how young children (under 10/12 months) early 
individuates entities lies on identify from what type of information (cf.: Xu (1999), 
Carey & Xu (2000); P.: 188 and Van de Walle, Carey & Prevor (2000)) an indexed 
object retains its index. In this sense, some researchers have claimed that featural 
information has a secondary role (vid.: Carey & Xu (2001)). From some evidence (vid.: 
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Xu & Carey (1996)), I’m tempted to think that infants use featural information as soon 
as they used spatiotemporal information to individuate objects, thus that objects 
spatiotemporally individuated are the initial stuff for interaction. This reason supports 
the idea that the basic stuff which external events consist in are moving, mutable, stable 
objects, instead holes and shadows are hosted in these events.  
A presupposition that I adopt here lies on accept that there’s no holes and shadows 
that do not depend on objects’ properties (vid.: Casati & Varzi (1994)), then, I’m 
tempting to think that, firstly, objects individuated from spatiotemporal information 
and, secondly, objects individuated from featural information are the basic stuff to 
interact with external events, despite these events includes non-objects, as holes and 
shadows.  
How much importance objects would have in human cognition may depend on which 
kind of stuff constitutes the basic reference of core believes in our AMCS. This could 
sound as a limited defense a strawsonian approach (vid.: Strawson (1959)): descriptive 
metaphysics tell us how special objects are whereas cognitive science doesn’t need to fit 
with our AMCS.  
My thesis is that how special are objects depends on what explanatory intentions we 
have: descriptive or revisionist (vid.: Goldman (1992)). If we adopt the later from the 
beginning plausibly we are asking for how special are objects to cognitive science to 
explaining human cognition development and, otherwise, if we adopt the former we are 
asking for how much central are objects in our AMCS. Understand which is the basic 
ontological stuff relevant to the fixation of core beliefs in our AMCS could help us to 
identify “strange principles of individuation” (vid.: Hirsch (1982)) restrained in our 
AMCS. I think that to adopt the descriptive way implies to start from characterizing 
AMCS –this differs from beginning from early cognitive develop of metaphysical 
schemes. Perhaps this strategy allows us to avoid overstated conclusions in cognitive 
sciences but, I think, we need initially to adopt an intermediary view. This is a 
methodological strategy since in science we could arrive to revisionist views that would 
favour prescriptive metaphysics. 
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III. Conclusion. 
 Seems plausible to accept the thesis that “it is not objects per se that have a special 
status in the mind of the child” (Giralt & Bloom (2000); P.: 497). I grasp this thesis in 
the sense that the only stuff that infants can individuated are not objects, but this not 
implies that objects do not make the core contribution to our AMCS, i.e. to constitute a 
platform for basic adaptive environmental performances in adult life. Plausibly, any 
young human cognitive system needs to stabilize capacities to track holes and shadows 
since these non concrete entities could be indispensable in a world perceived as 
populated with objects. 
  
____________________ 
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